A forensics overview and analysis of USB flash memory devices by Sansurooah, Krishnun
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Australian Digital Forensics Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 
3-12-2009 
A forensics overview and analysis of USB flash memory devices 
Krishnun Sansurooah 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sansurooah, K. (2009). A forensics overview and analysis of USB flash memory devices. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.4225/75/57b28b7240cd3 
DOI: 10.4225/75/57b28b7240cd3 
7th Australian Digital Forensics Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, December 3rd 2009. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf/70 
Proceedings of the 7th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 
99 | P a g e
A forensics overview and analysis of USB flash memory devices 
Krishnun Sansurooah 
secau – Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Abstract 
Current forensic tools for examination of embedded systems like mobile phones and PDAs mostly perform data 
extraction on a logical level and do not consider the type of storage media during data analysis. This report 
suggests different low level approaches for the forensic examination of flash memories and describes three low-
level data acquisition methods for making full memory copies of flash memory devices. Results of a file system 
study in which USB memory sticks from 45 different make and models were used are presented. For different 
mobile phones, this paper shows how full memory copies of their flash memories can be made and which steps 
are needed to translate the extracted data into a format that can be understood by common forensic media 
analysis tools. Artefacts, caused by flash specific operations like block erasing and wear levelling, are discussed 
and directions are given for enhanced data recovery and analysis of data originating from flash memory. 
Keywords Embedded systems flash memory, USB flash memory, flash translation layer (FTL), forensics 
acquisition and analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
The era of portable digital data has seen an exponential expansion with the evolution in consumer electronics. 
The possible criminal use of mobile phones, personal digital assistant (PDAs), digital cameras, portable music 
and data storage devices has grown at an equally rapid rate. Most of these devices make use of memory cards 
which allow them to maintain portable data storage in a non-volatile way. These handheld devices have the 
capabilities to store either small or huge amounts of data. (Hu, 2004). This has all been made possible because of 
the availability of a non-volatile storage medium known as flash memory which has played a key role due to its 
size, low power consumption and resistance to shock (Douglis et al., 1994). 
Flash memory is presently the most controlling non-volatile solid-state technology on the market and is 
accessible enough to be used for either legal or illegal purposes. From a forensics point of view, the tiny flash 
devices or drives may make the life of forensics experts very problematic when it becomes necessary to acquire 
and analyse their content. Current forensic tools for the examination of handheld devices, such as mobile phones 
and PDAs, do not always permit the successful acquisition and recovery of all the data that have been stored on 
the devices. Most of the time-deleted data, or other deleted data, which might be useful evidence about the 
offence perpetrated, cannot be acquired. The only way to be sure of acquiring all the data from a flash memory 
drive is to acquire the data at the lowest layer where evidence may be expected (Breeuwsma et al., 2007).  
Flash memory is gaining popularity, as mentioned earlier, due to being shock resistant, being small enough for 
transportation of data to be hardly noticeable, its low power consumption, excellent response rates when it 
comes to random access time, the non-volatility of the medium and its low cost. In certain countries the number 
of flash memory drives is greater than the number of inhabitants (Breeuwsma et al., 2007).  
Nowadays there are more and more systems using flash memory drives, either in conjunction with or as systems 
embedded into driver applications. Hence it is of the utmost importance that a sound way of data acquisition is 
developed to sustain and present evidence collected from flash memory drives in a court of law. Unfortunately, 
when it comes to flash memory storage systems, current forensics tools have great difficulties in acquiring 
essential data.  
While writing to a flash memory storage system, the flash memory management scheme is actuated by the 
characteristics of the underlying flash media. The access patterns are released by the file systems and user 
applications (Huang et al., 2008). Despite including some of the evaluation tools for benchmarking storage 
devices, such as HD bench for hard drives and FD bench for flash drives, these tools do not take the flash 
memory characteristics into consideration, especially the flash memory management scheme which is more 
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commonly known as the flash translation layer (FTL) (Huang, 2008). According to Huang et al. (2008), the 
performance and reliability of any flash memory storage device is highly influenced by the following major 
factors: 
1. the underlying flash media, 
2. the management scheme design, and  
3. the access patterns generated by the application. 
Therefore, flash memory drives present a serious challenge for law enforcement, especially for forensics 
investigators who are hitting a brick wall when it comes to the acquisition and analysis of evidence gathered 
from the flash drives. Given that not much attention is being paid to these devices, the lack of understanding of 
how to acquire and analyse evidential data forensically, especially at the FTL level, is the primary motivation for 
researching this area. 
FLASH TECHNOLOGY 
Flash memory is a type of electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), meaning that the 
flash memory is non-volatile, i.e. it memorises its value without having to induce power, hence it is relatively 
dense (Gal & Toledo, 2005). Flash drives are commonly used to store files and other objects on different 
handheld devices such as mobile phones, PDAs, portable music, USB drives, digital cameras, to name just a few. 
However, flash memory write/read/erase behaviours are very different from other normal memories, such as 
random access memory (RAM) and magnetic disks. With flash devices, the memory cells can only be written to 
a limited number of times, typically between 10,000 and 1,000,000 times, whereafter  they become unstable as 
they wear out (Gal & Toledo, 2005). 
Flash (EEPROM) is normally available in two types: 
1. NOR flash, which allows and supports a fast random access speed, but at a very high cost. 
2. NAND flash, which is newer and cheaper, with the advantage that it carries a larger storage 
 capacity and achieves decent, if not high, execution for large read/write operations  
               (Lim &  Park, 2006). 
These two different flash memory types have a common factor: each bit in a new flash chip will be appointed a 
logical one where only a WRITE operation can alter its value from a 1 to a 0. However, the only method of 
performing this change is to go through an ERASE operation (Woodhouse, 2001). NAND flash memory chips 
are compartmentalized into blocks. Each block has a pre-defined number of pages which are fixed and which, in 
turn, are scaled down into regions for storing data. There is also a free space region which is responsible for 
holding the status of the data region.  
Woodhouse (2001) stated that the first generation of NAND flash memory had a typical page size of 512 bytes,
each carrying a surplus of 16 bytes of “out of band” storage space which was designed to be used for metadata 
and error correction. Normally NAND flash is written by injecting the necessary data into an internal buffer one 
byte at a time, requesting a WRITE command.
A NOR flash memory device operates differently by allowing bits to be wiped out individually until every bit is 
cleared. In NAND flash, only a few WRITES cycles are written to each page before the page’s content becomes 
undefined and has to wait for the next ERASE pass by the blocks where the page is located. In other words, each 
time data is altered, the new data must be written to a different and available page in a different location (Lim & 
Park, 2006).   
Therefore the old page where the data was written initially is considered to be a dead page. When a period of 
time has passed, the amount of dead pages accumulated is reclaimed by the system, which performs an ERASE 
operation to make the dead pages available again.  
This process is known as “garbage collection” (Woodhouse, 2001) and reclaims the invalid pages. However, the 
flash memory block has a limited number of allowable ERASE cycles; therefore a strategy must be put in place 
to ensure that all the erased blocks are performed evenly to achieve a longer life span of the flash memory 
device. This is also known as “wear-levelling” (M-Systems, 1998). 
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FLASH TRANSLATION LAYER (FTL) 
Flash memory has gained a lot of popularity during the past decade, because of its storage capabilities which 
have already reached gigabytes of data, its fast speed to access data, its non-volatile memory storage, small size, 
shock resistance, low powered devices and, finally, because it is inexpensive (Intel Corporation, 1998). The FTL 
driver has been introduced to work between existing file systems, including existing operating systems, or even 
embedded applications. Flash memory is designed to make linear flash memory like writing onto a disk. 
According to Huang et al. (2008), the flash translation layer protocol (FTL) and the NAND flash translation 
layer (NFTL) are very popular. The FTL driver therefore mimics the flash media as block devices so that both 
the user and the systems may access the flash media transparently. It was therefore concluded that there could be 
two types of flash memory chips, as shown in figure 1 above. 
The first type includes both the MTD and the FTL driver in one package, such as the USB flash drive. The 
second type does not include the MTD, as illustrated in figure 1. Therefore this block level layer is responsible 
for redirecting the location of updated data from one page to another. It is also responsible for the management 
of the actual physical location of the data which is located into a mapping table. This mapping of logical to 
physical location can only be achieved at the page level (FTL) or at the block level (NFTL) (Ban, 1995). The 
main differences between these two mapping techniques are the table sizes and the redirecting constraints. 
Nonetheless, these methods may be used directly on the flash translation layer (Lim & Park, 2006). 
Lim and Park (2006) also mentioned that making direct use of an existing file system may impact on 
performance, due to the fact that file systems are designed and developed for disk-storage systems. Therefore the 
way of accessing the files, the file sizes and the file metadata on disk storage is not the same as on a flash 
memory device. 
JOURNAL FLASH FILE SYTEM (JFFS) 
A journaling flash file system is a log-structured file system where nodes with their content, such as data and 
metadata, are stored on flash chips in a sequential order advancing further into other free slots or spaces in a 
linear pattern through the storage space.  In JFFS there is only one node type which is known as “struct jffs-raw-
inode” and which has a single association with the inode. According to Woodhouse (2001), the different 
constituents of the inode area common header retain information about the current metadata file system of that 
particular inode and the data. The log contains fixed-sized sections of the disk which are attached, together 
forming a pointer list. Both metadata and data are placed at the back of the log, thus never overwriting the old 
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Device Driver Device Driver 
Flash
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Flash File 
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File System 
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Figure 1 The MTD storage system architecture. 
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data recorded on the storage space. Therefore the modified data need to be written somewhere else (Gal & 
Toledo, 2005). Originally developed by Axis Communication AB for embedded Linux. (Axis Communication, 
2004), it was remodelled later to create journaling flash file system 2 (JFFS2). JFFS2 was more flexible and thus 
permitted new type of nodes to be defined whilst retaining the ability to work backwards.  
Kawaguchi, Nishioka and Motoda (1995) pointed out that log-structured file systems were appropriate for flash 
memory management, especially when it came to designing a block-mapping device. 
Every JFFS2 node has a common header which contains the node’s length, the node’s cyclic redundancy 
checksum and its type. Yet these are not the only data that the common header retains; it uniquely identifies the 
node’s structure and the node’s type field which hold a bitmask allowing either an unsupported or a supported 
format of data to be read. This was not the only obstacle that flash memory drives were facing. Systems will 
scan every single node and will therefore create two different structures. The first structure will be a list of every 
inode, and their respective versions, and the second will include all structures that are equivalent to a valid node 
on the flash. As mentioned previously, those two data structures are then linked, with one containing all the 
physical addresses to assist in garbage collection and the other a sequential order of all the nodes (Gal & Toledo, 
2005). 
JFFS2 also uses a simple wear-levelling technique which helps to extend the life span of flash memory drives, in 
this example the USB flash. Obviously, with flash memory drives, data may be written to an address several 
times, typically between 10,000 and 100,000 (Corsair, 2007). If you write to the same location over and over, it 
is more likely that the flash chip will wear out at that address. Therefore wear-levelling is used to make sure that 
data is distributed evenly across each memory block of the whole USB flash memory. 
YET ANOTHER FLASH FILLING SYSTEM (YAFFS)
Written and developed by Aleph One as a NAND file system, YAFFS has a more efficient approach than JFFS 
and JFFS2 (Aleph One, 2002). The way in which YAFFS addresses the pages in the flash memory drives is 
totally different. All files are saved in fixed-size chunks of either 512 bytes, one kilobyte (1KB) or two kilobytes 
(2KB) (Gal & Toledo, 2005). Each page is assigned a file ID and a chunk number. The inode number is 
associated with the file ID. The file ID, also known as the header, will normally be 16 bytes for 512 bytes, 30 
bytes for one kilobyte (1KB) and 42 for bytes for two kilobytes (2KB). Having the same characteristics as 
JFFS2, the mapping information on the flash is the only content of each and every chunk which lies as part of 
the header. Consequently, at the time of mounting the flash drive, all the headers must be read from the flash to 
generate the file ID. File ID are generally stored in RAM at all times as for the JFFS principle. Therefore, to save 
RAM, a more effective map structure to map file locations to the corresponding physical addresses was required 
and subsequently addressed by YAFFS. This mapping plan follows a tree-structure where the internal nodes 
hold 8 pointers to the other nodes and leaf nodes hold 16 pointers to the physical location. With the YAFFS, 
which is slightly more complex than the previous version, the primary aim was to get YAFFS2 to write in a 
sequential pattern within the ERASE units so that all the pages could be erased one after the other. (Gal & 
Toledo, 2005). 
Lim and Park (2006) agreed that the flash memory drive normally writes the raw or untransformed data one byte 
at a time. Each time that data is altered, the new data must be re-written into a different and available page in a 
different location. The FTL is a technique used to hold some of the direct map embedded within the flash drive, 
whilst reducing the action of updating the map on the flash drive (Ban, 1995). Using the FTL in turn uses a 
virtual block map (VBM) of 32 bits to represent each entry point to a logical address of the flash media where 
the virtual data block resides (Intel Corporation, 1998). Since the untransformed data that has been injected into 
the medium still exists, any altered or new data is therefore written into another available page at a different 
location. Only the FTL knows the locations through the mapping table. Since the original data still resides on the 
flash memory chip and because the FTL and garbage collection happens after a number of writes, recovering the 
virtual-to-physical list becomes very challenging. This paper intends to determine how to acquire the raw 
evidential data residing on the medium forensically without tampering with the untransformed data. 
The following figures will provide a better understanding of how the flash memory drives are arranged and how 
data is stored on them.  
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Figure 3(i) depicts an illustration of the data that are stored on a flash medium after the initial injection of data. 
O    
 O   
O O   
 O  O 
    
When the first data are stored for the first time on the flash memory drive, they are put into an available free slot, 
according to their sizes, as illustrated in figure 3(i) by the letter ‘O’.  
When the data has been changed or modified, or new data need to be saved onto the flash memory drive, the 
FTL determines which is the best way of storing the new data on the medium. Figure 3(ii) shows the pattern of 
the modified data, denoted by the letter ‘X’, that will be injected on the medium. 
 X X  
X X   
   X 
 X   
O X X  
X O/X   
 O  X 
 O/X  O 
There is an overlap of the initial data already stored on the medium and the newly modified data or newly added 
data needing to be stored in the memory, thereby causing some difficulties in managing the storage space. The 
FTL is responsible for re-organizing the arrangement in which the data needs to be stored on the flash memory 
drive.  
O X X X
X O X X
O O X X
 O X O
According to Lim and Park (2006), each time that data is modified and needs to be written to the flash memory 
drive, the date for the new data, which may be additions to an existing document or the retouched sections of an 
image, must be written into a different free page in a separate location within the flash chip in order to denote 
that the page is a live one. Depicted in figure 3(iv), and marked with a red ‘X’ and circle, both the initial and 
modified data is represented on the same chips with some data having to shift to a different location managed by 
the FTL. Since there is a conflict between the initial data and the new or modified data that need to be stored on 
the flash memory drive, the only way that this may be resolved is that the FTL is forced to ERASE the initial 
data already in place on the flash chip and then performs a READ/ERASE/WRITE the modified or new data 
onto the same location. This forces the flash drive to perform an action that will cause wear-levelling to the 
memory chip. After a period of time, the memory chip will degrade and the flash drive will become unstable, 
wearing out sooner than its expected life span. 
Figure 3(i) illustrates the initial injection of data onto the flash device 
Figure 3(ii) represents the data that needs to be added to the flash medium. 
Figure 3(iii) shows the overlapping on both injected data and the altered data that need 
to be written to the flash memory.
Injected data initially and overlapping data 
that need to be stored on the medium 
Figure 3(iv) shows when both the initially injected data and the added data have been 
recorded onto the medium which is indicated by the circled red ‘X’ and which can be in 
any temporary space on the flash medium.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Due to ongoing change and evolution in digital technology, there has been an exponential growth in the number 
of flash memory drives. The data stored on flash drives reflects a spectrum of human behaviour and may become 
subject to a forensics investigation. However, forensics tools for acquisition and analysis of flash memory drives 
are of relatively low quality. There is currently no established framework or methodology to support law 
enforcement officers who may need to carry out forensic analysis of these devices (Breeuwsma et al., 2007). 
This contrasts with the basic traditional computer forensics methodologies and standards that are already 
supported by various government agencies (Ayers, Jansen, Cilleros & Daniellou, 2005). 
Brinson et al. (2006) claimed that the tiny and adaptable nature of these devices make forensics investigators’ 
tasks even more complex. Organized crime is using flash memory technologies to perpetrate its illegal activities. 
Due to their high portability and small sizes, anyone may use USB flash drives to carry valuable information or 
secrets that have been stolen from a business. Criminals arrested under terrorism charges may reveal useful 
information about planned bombings or other information that help prevent further catastrophes. People 
suspected of abusing children and transporting child pornography may be found to have used USB flash drives 
to share images on a particular network. Flash drives may be attached to key rings or be used as USB wireless 
dongles for wireless mouses without being detected. A study conducted in the Unites States of America has 
demonstrated that the highest percentage of Internet users addicted to pornography is aged between 12 and 17 
years (Rockwell, 2005). 
Methodologies have been designed to acquire data from computer systems and analyse evidence forensically. A 
forensics investigator will follow a set of standards and procedures before any conclusions are drawn. A 
complete analysis of the whole system may be necessary: log files may permit the examiner to draw conclusions 
about the particular source of the attack on the system and why it occurred (Forté, 2005; Jones, Brejtlich & Rose, 
2006). However, very little attention has been paid to the forensic analysis of flash memory drives. (Boyd & 
Foster,2004; Jones & Meyer, 2004; Marcella& Greenfield, 2002). 
Flash memory drives do not generally hold connection logs but fortunately they do keep a partial record of their 
entire virtual block mapping, i.e. virtual-to-logical, making use of virtual block map (VBM) (Intel, 1998). With 
more and more flash memory drives flooding the market and being accessible to anyone, it is possible that 
everyone owns at least one. The potential for flash drives to become a major source of digital evidence is 
illustrated in figure 5 below. 
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction of the small scale digital devices in contrast to the level of interaction with the digital 
evidence world which is quite significant. 
 
The major focus of this research will be the development of a methodology to acquire, analyse and classify 
untransformed evidential data. This might require the investigator to develop unique methods or steps to 
associate, verify, tag, secure and preserve useful information from a presumed criminal use of flash memory 
drives which have the potential of retaining gigabytes of data which may be revealed in the prosecution of 
criminals. 
DIGITAL FORENSICS 
Carr, Gunsch and Reith (2002) disagreed that lawbreakers believe that there is a level of obscurity associated 
with perpetrating electronic crimes. Nolan et al. (2005) agreed that criminals nowadays are aware that evidential 
data may reside on an electronic device for a long time after the crime has been committed, allowing forensic 
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investigators to retrieve information later mainly with “persistent data” which would remain on the medium even 
when it is powered down (Nolan et al., 2005). Despite computer forensics no longer being the only area of 
interest for forensics investigators, criminals are breaching laws using other small scale digital devices, including 
cellular phones, digital cameras and PDAs. Some research has already been undertaken and methodologies 
developed for collecting evidence from small devices with volatile memory (Jansen & Ayers, 2004). There are 
no detailed guidelines, methodologies, models, frameworks or best practices available to the investigator who 
wishes to acquire and analyse non-volatile evidential data on USB flash memory drives. 
Brown (2006) defined digital forensics as being an in-depth inspection of computer networks and digital devices 
to collect evidential information in such a way that it would be presentable for admission in a court of law. The 
Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer Based Electronic Evidence 
(2003) is a set of guidelines commonly followed when electronic data are to be acquired. Among the four rules 
that the ACPO provides, the Guide agrees that not all electronic evidence would fall under the Guide’s scope. An 
example of evidence falling outside the Guide’s scope would be the forensics acquisition and analysis of a USB 
flash memory drive, as its architecture differs from traditional storage media. Yet the process of evidence 
acquisition for forensics purposes has to follow a set of guidelines in the collection, preservation and 
presentation of the elements in a court of law. The gathered evidence may involve threatening letters, child porn 
photos or videos, illegal pornographic photographs or materials, network log files, details of planned terrorist 
attacks, information about other terrorist cells, fraud or identity theft. Data may be retrieved from seized 
equipment (Jones & Meyler, 2004). 
Computer storage media such as hard disks and volatile and non-volatile memory drives may be forensically 
searched with various pre-tested frameworks or methodologies. Despite outlining the different forensic 
frameworks available for use, Carr, Gunsch and Reith (2002) demonstrated that these models and protocols are 
not normalized. Both the United States Department of Justice and the US Secret Service (USSS) remodel and 
recalibrate existing guidelines to suit their requirements and sometimes need to develop their own methodologies 
to address a particular issue. This depends on the different scenarios that they are assigned, i.e. depending on the 
device incriminated, the operating systems or embedded applications and the means available to the forensics 
investigators. 
PDAs and mobile phones have embedded software and carry operating systems which constantly keep changing 
the content stored (Jansen & Ayers,2004). On small devices, this may occur without user interaction, thus being 
in contradiction to the ACPO Rule 1 discussed previously. Casey (2004) clarified the benefit of using a toll Win 
HEX to acquire a memory dump which can allow unencrypted passwords to be retrieved. This mechanism to 
acquire data from sources such as networks might be used in the same way to recover raw evidential data from 
flash memory drives. 
The second rule employed by the ACPO (2003) declared that the original untransformed data should only be 
accessed under extraordinary circumstances. This does not take into consideration that, with flash memory 
drives, data is never written to the same location twice. With the garbage collection process happening in the 
flash memory drives, this ACPO rule will not be applicable. The examiner will be left with no flexibility. 
The Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence issued by the USSS referred to flash memory drives under 
“other electronic storage devices” heading (USSS, 2006), whereas the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which 
is a subset of the Unites States Department of Justice, listed the flash memory drive more precisely under 
“thumb drive” in their Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders publication (NIJ, 
2008). 
According to a study carried out by Carr, Gunsch and Reith (2002) to analyse the methods and techniques which 
cover the field of computer and digital forensics, the terminology ”digital forensics” should be tailored to 
encompass both current and future digital technologies. Digital forensic procedures are not addressing the 
essentials when it comes to small scale digital devices such as USB flash memory drives, meaning that 
evidential information can be retraced and recovered to be analysed from fixed digital storage and from non-
volatile storage. 
The very first principle when analysing any piece of electronic evidential data is to ensure that the data held on 
the medium is kept unchanged, hence establishing procedures to preserve, identify and extract useful 
information. The various digital forensics models available (Carrier & Spafford, 2003; Department of Justice, 
2001; O'Ciardhuain, 2004) support a set of defined processes and procedures for acquiring, preserving, 
analysing, and finally presenting the data recovered from the digital devices. O'Ciardhuain (2004), however, 
suggested a model which emphasizes the generic procedures of digital evidence collection during an 
investigation, but did not consider flash drives. 
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Breeuwsma et al. (2007) revealed that, when it is necessary to deal with non-volatile flash memory, the easiest 
non-invasive way to read flash data is by using a flasher that make a copy of all flash memory data from the 
source system to another separate system for further analysis. (Breeuwsma et al., 2007). The report also 
mentioned that there is no standardized way of performing such operations. However, using such tools can create 
havoc as these tolls are mainly developed by manufacturers or service centres for testing and debugging 
functionalities or simply for checking and modifying the intended purpose of the device. Yet, forensics 
investigators have to be very prudent while using these tools as they have other options that might cause the 
whole device to lose all its content and beyond forensics recovery. Breeuwsma et al. (2007) refer to another 
method of accessing the flash memory drives through the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), also known as 
boundary-scan, when the flasher is not an option. Van der Kniff (2002) pointed out that using a universal 
memory chip reader /programmer and de-soldering the chip from the confiscated device could be a very risky 
option. Modern systems on the market have a special port called the JTAG test access port. As in most 
embedded systems, as represented in Figure 7, the flash memory is mounted or connected to the other chips like 
a processor which can be used to access the flash memory of the embedded device as the JTAG test access port 
is meant to be used for testing and debugging (Breeuwsma et al., 2007). The JTAG option is very safe as it will 
produce a forensics image of the content of the flash memory drive and dump it onto a different medium for later 
analysis. 
Another feasible way of producing a forensics dump of the flash memory drive is to de-solder the flash chip 
from the printed circuit board (PCB) and read the memory through a flash reader or programmer. As most chips 
nowadays are packed in a thin small outline package (TSOP) or on a micro ball grid array (BGA), the chips 
could be physically extracted from the embedded system and hence imaged for further analysis or examination. 
Again there is no proper way of handling, or a sound forensic methodology, to ensure this operation of 
extraction and imaging of the flash memory chip is performed successfully so that it might be admissible as an 
exhibit in a court of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Digital forensics has been evolving during the past decades. It is no longer focusing on computers only but 
instead includes many small scale digital devices. Moreover, there is very little evidence of research being 
undertaken in the area of flash memory drives where this research will be beneficial to the law enforcement 
field. More research needs to be done on the flash read mechanisms used by flasher tools in order to adapt these 
mechanisms for usage in the next generation of forensic data acquisitions tools. Steps have been illustrated for 
translating acquired flash data to a level that can be understood by existing forensic tools targeted towards 
commonly used file systems.  
FURTHER RESEARCH 
More research is needed for flash data that cannot be directly translated to file system level. More research is 
also needed on the relation between flash specific operations like block erasing and wears levelling on one side 
and the resulting artefacts and potentials for data recovery and analysis on the other side. With the results of this 
research, future forensic tools might be able to improve the power and efficiency of embedded systems 
examinations for reasonably skilled IT professionals. Further research will attempt to extract the flash chips and 
the FTL micro-controller chips to have a better in-depth analysis of how evidential data could be recovered from 
the different USB flash devices. 
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